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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. J. D . .A.l ... :JI CONSTRUCTION 
CO~IP .... \.XY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THO:JI .... \.S B. CHILD and C. \V. 
CHILD, co-partners doing business 
under the name and style of Thomas 
B. Child and Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 7790 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered December 
5, 1951 dismissing the action upon the motion of the de-
fendants (Record p. 60). For convenience the parties will 
be referred to as they appeared in the court below. 
The motion to dismiss was made at a;;·pre-trial hear-
ing called by the Judge to whom the case had been as-
signed for trial by jury. No jury was called or empanel-
ed. No Findings of Fact were made or signed by the 
Judge or waived by the plaintiff, nor was any op1n1on 
rendered by the Judge. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
THE PLEADINGS 
The Complaint (Record pp. 1-2) alleged that the 
defendants had made an offer to the plaintiff to furnish 
all labor and 1naterials necessary for the completion of 
the brickwork on firewalls at the Utah Genera~ Depot, 
Ogden, Utah, according to plans and specifications for the 
total of $91,392.00. That relying upon that bid the plain-
tiff submitted a bid to the Government to do the entire 
work specified in the plans for a flat sum and was award-
ed the contract upon that bid. That the plaintiff accepted 
the defendants' offer, that the defendants repudiated the 
contract and refused to perform and that plaintiff was re-
quired to do the work which defendants had offered to 
do on its ·own account at a cost to it in excess of $79,000 
over defendants' bid. 
The Answer of the defendants (Record pp. 3-5) ad-
mitted the offer, but denied that the plaintiff's bid to the 
Government was made in reliance thereon and denied 
that plaintiff had accepted it. They alleged that the plain-
tiff tendered to defendants a form of contract which 
varied from their bid in material respects. The Answer 
also denied the damage claimed. 
PROCEEDINGS 
At the instance of the defendants, the deposition 
of R. C. Riding, the superintendent of the plaintiff and 
the individual by whom all negotiations on behalf of the 
plaintiff in connection with the contract were carried on, 
was t~aken January 20, 1951. On the same date the depo-
sition of Mr. Thomas B. Child, one of the defendant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
partners and the individual by \vhoin all negotiations 
on behalf of the defendants \vere carried on, was taken 
at plaintiff's instance. (These depositions are incorpo-
rated in the Record as a separate document of 118 pages 
and given Record page numbers beginning at page 102.) 
Thereafter the case \vas assigned for trial vvithout a 
jury upon den1and of the plaintiff and was later trans-
ferred to the jury calendar on motion of the defendants 
(Record pp. 6-10). It \vas assigned to Judge Levvis of the 
District Court for trial during S-eptember, 1951. Judge 
Lewis called the case for pre-trial, and after pretrial con-
ference he entered an order in which the parties were 
directed to file a vvritten stipulation (of facts) before 
September 14th (Record pp. 11-12). 
No stipulation was entered into by the parties until 
Septe1nber 29, 1951 when the stipulation found at pages 
14 to 29 of the Record was signed by counsel for both 
parties and submitted to Judge Lewis. This stipulation 
\vas used as a basis for the facts agreed upon by counsel 
at the subsequent pretrial before Judge Ellett (Record 
pp. 30-55). Those agreed facts ~s well as those upon 
which no agreement was reached will be stated below. 
~feanwhile the case had been transferred to Judge 
Ellett, who called a pretrial conference on October 16th. 
At this conference counsel for defendants refused to 
agree that the evidence as recorded in the depositions and 
stipulation might be considered and weighed by the court 
for the purpose of determining as a matter of law 
whether a contract had or had not been entered into by 
the parties (Record pp. 31-34) In addition, the plaintiff 
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withheld its consent that the judge might weigh the evi-
dence and decide the case as a trier of the facts (Record 
pp. 52-3). Trial by jury was not waived by either side. 
At the close of the pretrial conference "the plaintiff 
1noved for an order holding the case for trial on the 
question of damages, the defendants moved to dismiss 
and the court set a date for argument (Record pp. 52-53). 
The argu1nents were heard October 20th and the court 
took the motions under advisement (Record p. 58). On 
October 26th, according to the entry in the register and 
the entries on the page prepared for the minutes of the 
court (Record p. 59) which on November 28th were still 
unsigned and bore no record of having been seen or ap-
proved by the Judge, he decided the motions (Record 
p. 61), denying the motion of the plaintiff and granting 
the motion to dismiss. On December 5, 1951, a formal 
order dismissing the action was signed by the Judge and 
entered by the clerk (Record p. 60). 
THE EVIDENCE 
The facts, both conceded and disputed, before the 
court at the time of the motions are as follows: 
The Government issued an Invitation to contractors 
to submit bids for the construction of firewalls in certain 
buildings located at the Ogden General Depot, Ogden, 
according to plans and specifications which had been pre-
pared therefor (Stipulation, Record pp·. 15, 35). The 
specifications called for the erection of twelve~ brick walls 
in four different buildings and the installation of rolling 
steel firedoors in each wall and for an alternate bid for 
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the 'vork in cnse the C oYerninent should decide· to install 
the firedoors later and brick in the doorways in the mean-
'vhile (See Exhibit _._\, including Invitation for Bids and 
Bid Forn1 included therein). Subsequently the Govern-
nlent issued an Addendum to the specifications which 
called for an alternate bid for the construction of the 
'valls and the installation of sliding steel firedoors in-
stead of rolling doors, and the bids for the "\York if the 
door,vays 'vere bricked in (See Exhibit B, Addendum 
Ko. 1 and Bid Form included). In the Bid form accom-
panying Addendum No. 1 the bid for rolling doors "\vas 
designated as Schedule I and the bid for sliding doors 
designated as Schedule II. The bids weTe to he opened 
June 22, 1950 at 2 P.M. 
Section SC-1 of the Special Conditions of the Speci-
fications referred to in the Invitation for Bids (Exhibit 
A) provided: 
"The contractor will be required to commence 
work under this contract within ten (10) calendar 
days after date of receipt by him of written notice 
to proceed, to prosecute said work with faithful-
ness and energy, and to complete the entire work 
ready for use not later than one hundred twenty 
(120) days after the date of receipt of the said 
notice to proceed. The time stated for completion 
shall include final cleanup of the premises." 
Section SC-16 of the S·pecial Conditions provided: 
"In case of failure on the part of the contrac-
tor to complete the work within the time fixed in 
the contract or any extensions thereof, the con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
tractor shall pay the Government as liquidated 
damages the sum of Fifty ($50) Dollars for each 
calendar day of delay until the work is completed 
or accepted." 
The plaintiff, a contracting corporation, intended 
to subn1it a bid for the· work and on June 20th Mr. Rid-
ing, its superintendent, called Mr. Tho1nas B. Child, a 
member of the defendant partnership long engaged in 
masonry and brickwork construction, and asked if they 
wished to submit a bid to do the brickwork on the project. 
Mr. Child said he would if he could se·e the plans and spe-
cifications, so Mr. Riding delivered and left with Mr. 
Child a set of the plans and specifications (Exhibit A) 
and discussed the proposed work with him. Mr. Riding 
did not give Mr. Child a copy of the Addendum No.1 at 
this time or at all (Record pp. 36-38; Stipulation para-
graphs 4, 5 and 6; Record p. 15). 
Mr. Child telephoned to the plaintiff a proposal to 
do the brickwork called for on the morning of June 22nd 
(Record p. 37; Stipulation paragraph 7, Record p. 16), 
and on the fo~lowing day confirmed it by letter (Record 
pp. 39, 43; Stipulation paragraphs 7-8; Record p. 17). 
Mr. Riding received the telephone bid, used the quotation 
in figuring the plaintiff's bid to the Government and 
submitted it before the time set for the opening (Record 
p. 41). The . plain tiff was the low bidder (Record p. 17). 
Shortly after the bids to the Government were open-
ed but before the contract had been a:warded, Mr. Riding 
told Mr. Child that the defendants' bid had been the 
lowest bid for the brickwork that plaintiff had received 
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and that he had used Child's bid in figuring plaintiff's 
bid. He also told nlr. Child that plajntiff's bid to the 
Governn1ent ha.d been lo\Y and that \Yhen they got fixed 
up \Yith the contrart the defendants could expect to get 
a contract for the brick\vork (Record p. 42, Stipulation 
paragraph 1~, Record p. 17). 
One week after the bid opening, the plaintiff was 
a\varded the contract on the basis of the Government's 
acceptance of plaintiff's bid of $190,392.00 for the entire 
job \Yith the installation of rolling steel doors on Schedule 
I of plaintiff's bid (Record pp. 40-41; Stipulation para-
graph 16; Record p. 19), which was the identical work 
specified in the plans and specifications delivered to 
Mr. Child as above stated (see Exhibits A and B). (Note: 
The reference to Schedule II on page 41 of the Record 
is erroneous.) 
On July 3rd according to Mr. Riding (Deposition 
p. 20), but !\Ir. Child thought it was earlier (Deposition 
p. 98), Mr. Riding called Mr. Child and asked him if he 
would rather set the reinforcing steel as his work pro-
gressed or have Daum Company or some other subcon-
tractor set it. !\fr. Child told him that he would rather 
place it himself provided the steel was cut, bent and 
designed properly. 
The general contract was dated June 29, 1950 (An-
swer, Record p. 3) and under date of July 10, 1950 the 
Government issued its formal notice to the plaintiff to 
proceed and to commence work within 10 days after re-
ceipt of the notice as provided in Sec. SC-1 of the Speci-
fications (Exhibit A). The notice to proceed was received 
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by the plaintiff at Inglewood, California on July 13 
(Record p. 19) . 
On July 11th the plaintiff mailed from its office at 
Inglewood, California, to the defendants at Salt Lake 
t\vo copies of a form of Subcontract Agreement dated 
the sarne day and signed by the plaintiff (Exhibit C). 
These were on printed forms, the blanks in which had 
been filled in with typewriting giving the date, the names 
of the parties, referred to as Contractor and Subcontrac-
tor respectively, a reference to the Government Contract 
and referred to the portion of the· work to be done by the 
Subcontractor (defendants) as "Brickwork." Then there 
was inserted the following : 
"Ti1ne is of the essence of this contract. Gen-
eral Contract to be completed within 120 calendar 
days. $50.00 per day penalty thereafter. Sub-con-
tractor to complete its work as scheduled." 
The form also included Addendum 1 as part of the speci-
fication for the work to be performed. No other of the 
many blanks in the printed form were filled in except 
the price to be paid subcontractor for his work, $91,392.-
00, in payments equal to 90% of the work done by the 
subcontractor during the preceding month and the bal-
ance 10% to be paid within 35 days after completion and 
acceptance of the project by the Government. 
These Subcontract forms were transmitted to the 
defendants with a letter dated July 11th requesting the 
defendants to sign and return one to the plaintiff (Record 
p. 44; Stipulation paragraph 19; Record p. 21). This 
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letter and subcontraet foTn1s \Yere received by the defend-
ants on or before July 13th and before the next conversa-
tion bet,veen the plaintiff and the defendants (Deposi-
tions, Riding p. 2:2, Child p. 100-101), on July 14th. 
~leanwhile ~Ir. Child had told the Interstate Brick 
Company that he 'vas expecting to sign up with the plain-
tiff for the job and had obtained the price of brick de-
livered at the job. l\fr. Child testified that he had not 
placed an order for 1,200,000 brick but had just told them 
(the Brick Company) that he expected to get the job 
(Record, Deposition Child, page 109). 1fr. Riding testi-
fied, however, that after the defendants had refused to 
go ahead with the vvork l\1:r. Child told him that he would 
turn over his order for brick on the project to the plain-
tiff and that he had on order 1,200,000 brick for this par-
ticular project (Deposition, Riding, pp. 26-27 -28). 
On July 14th Mr. Riding called Mr. Child by tele-
phone to make an appointment to have Mr. Child go to 
Ogden with him and meet the other subcontractors there 
and go over the work and get his ideas how he would like 
to handle his part of the work. Mr. Child agreed to ride 
up with Riding at 9 o'clock the next morning and said 
nothing about having received the subcontract forms or 
having any objections to its terms or provisions (Deposi-
tion, Riding p. 21). Mr. Child said that in this conversa-
tion Riding wanted him to go over the job with him and 
that Child then told him they had received the forn1 of 
contract and had decided not to sign the j·ob up· (Deposi-
tion, Child p. 99). 
The following morning, July 15th, Mr. Riding called 
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on Mr. Child at his home when for the first time, accord-
ing to Riding, Mr. Child told him that he and his brothers 
had met the night before and had decided not to go 
through with the contract because of the conditions 
following the outbreak of the war in Korea, that they had 
been losing men and because of the insertion in the sub-
contract form of the words "general contract to be com-
pleted within 120 calendar days" and "$50.00 per day 
penalty thereafter." It was in this conversation that Mr. 
Child offered to turn over to the plaintiff his order for 
the 1,200,000 brick he had expected to use on the job (De-
position, Riding, pp. 22-28). 
Mr. Riding offered to strike from the S-ubcontract 
form the clause "$50.00 per day penalty thereafter" but 
~Ir. Child still refused to go ahead (Deposition, p. 23). · 
~fr. Child denied that Riding had offered to strike any-
thing from the S.ubcontract Form and his version of the 
conversation at this time is contained in his Deposition 
at pages 100-103. 
There is no evidence that the defendants had with-
drawn· their offer until after they had received the sub-
contract from the plaintiff or, according to plaintiff's 
testimony, before the meeting of Mr. Child and Mr. Rid-
ing on the morning of July 14th after Mr. Child had 
agreed to go to Ogden to lay out the work. 
Under date of July 25th the plaintiff wrote the 
defendants a letter requesting them to advise plaintiff 
by 5 o'clock July 29th of their willingness to proceed to 
carry out the terms of their proposal in default of which 
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the plaintiff would make other arrangen1ents for the per-
formance of the \York and hold the defendants responsible 
for the damages (Record pp. 26-~7). The defendants re-
plied by letter the following day .. repeating their refusal 
to go ahead, saying: 
---In the subcontract which you submitted to us 
under date of July 11, 1950 you added a material 
variance to our proposal in that you required the 
work to be completed within 120 calendar days 
and provided for a $50 per day penalty thereafter 
and which was not contemplated in our original 
proposal. 
'~The writer discussed this matter with Mr. 
Riding about two weeks ago "~hen he took up the 
form of the subcontract you submitted and ex-
plained to Mr. Riding that we would not accept 
the subcontract or execute it with the changes 
both as to the time limit and the penalties, and 
the writer explained further that because of pres-
ent conditions and the changes in the labor market 
by reason of war conditions and our loss of em-
ployees that we would not execute any subcontract 
with you for this work." 
The defendants never did sign any contract to do 
the work and never did any work on the project (Record 
p. 46; Record p. 26; Stipulation paragraph 24) and after 
receipt of the defendants' letter of July 26th the plaintiff 
let a subcontract to Clark Ivory to do the work for $95,-
000.00 (Record p. 49, Exhibit F). This contract was later 
abrogated (Record p. 54) and the work was ultimately 
completed by the plaintiff through other subcontracts. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS WHICH WERE STIPULATED REQUIR.ED 
A FINDNG AND CONCLUSION AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE OFFER OF THE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT A CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE 
PRIOR TO THE REFUSAL OF THE DEFENDANTS TO 
PROCEED. 
POINT II. 
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS A CONFIRMATION OF THE PREVIOUS ACCEPT-
ANCE OF THE OFFER AND THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS BUT THE WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF THE CONTRACT 
SO CREATED. 
POINT III. 
THE SUBCONTRACT FORM SUBMITTED TO DEFEND-
ANTS WAS NOT A COUNTER-OFFER OR REJECTION OF 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSAL. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT. 
POINT V. 
IF THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES AS STIPULATED 
WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE 
INTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE OFFER 
OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
ACTS AND CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF TO CONVEY 
SUCH INTENTION TO THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOB 
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THE JURY, .AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS WAS ERROR. 
POINT \TI. 
THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
'VITHOUT FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, AND WITfiOUT 
A MOTION FOR SUMlVIARY JUDGMENT AND NOTICE 
THEREOF WAS ERROR . 
. A.RGU1fENT 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS WHICH WERE STIPULATED REQUIRED 
A FINDNG AND CONCLUSION AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE OFFER OF THE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND THAT A CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE 
PRIOR TO THE REFUSAL OF THE DEFENDANTS TO 
PROCEED. 
Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. (2d) 1002 
was an action by a subcontractor against the principal 
contractor for breach of contract and damages. To es-
tablish the contract, the plaintiff relied upon certain acts 
and conduct of the defendant as evidencing his accept-
ance of an offer by the plaintiff to haul roofing material 
needed by the defendant in the performance of the gene-
ral contract. The lower court had non suited the plaintiff 
and dismissed the complaint. On appeal this court re-
viewed the evidence and said: 
"* * * It is clear that the instrument signed by 
the plaintiff was a.t least an offer to do the work 
in question in accordance with its terms but before 
it could become a binding contract the defendants 
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would have to accept the same or assent to its 
terms. This the defendants might have done by 
a written or oral statement to that effect. If the 
defendants had made such a statement the mean-
ing of which was una1nbiguous, the interpretation 
thereof would have been a question of law for the 
court. Plain tiff does not rely on any such state-
ment, but does rely on a series of acts and circum-
stances which he claims are a manifestation of 
defendant's assent to and acceptance of plaintiff's 
offer. * * * 
"It is a well recognized rule of law that where 
a contract is not required to he in writing, mutual 
assent or the meeting of the minds may be proved 
by words spoken as well as by acts and conduct. 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, vT ol. 1, 
Chapter 3, Section 21 says 'The manifestation of 
mutual assent may be made wholly or partly by 
written or spoken words or by other acts or con-
duct.' 
" '17 C.J.S.. Contracts, p. 373, sec. 41a * * • 
an acceptance need not be express or formal, 
but may be shown by words, conduct, or acquies-
cence indicating assent to the proposal or offer.'" 
In the present case, the plaintiff, by acts and conduct 
communicated to the defendants, had clearly and un-
equivocably manifested its acceptance of their bid and 
thereby had created a binding contract prior to the re-
fusal by defendants to proceed with the work. 
(a) Mr. Riding solicited the bid from the defend-
ants and supplied them with the plans and specifications 
to enable the defendants to intelligently figure their bid. 
He used the defendants' figures in preparing the plain-
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tiff's bid to the Govern1nent, \Yhich bid upon opening 
\Yas found to be lo\\~. 
:Jir. l';hild, 'vho eYidently \Yas follovving the matter 
closely and kne\Y that the plaintiff 'vas the lovv bidder, 
called :Jir. Riding up to see if he, Child, had the job 
(Child Deposition p. 97). ~lr. Riding told him that his bid 
"~as lo\Y on the brick\\york, that he had used it in figuring 
plaintiff's bid, that plaintiff's bid 'vas low and that he 
expected to get the job. ~Ir. Riding said further (as 
quoted by Jir. Child) : 
'~You kno'v how things are, it takes the Gov-
ernment quite a while to decide what they want, 
but I think after we have got fixed up for it we 
will give you a form of contract." 
We submit that this was the equivalent of a state-
ment by the plaintiff that it had accepted defendants' 
bid conditioned only upon the Government awarding 
plaintiff the contract on the basis of the specifications 
upon which the defendants had bid. 
(b) The conditional acceptance of plaintiff's bid 
was made final upon the happenings of the condition. 
The Government accepted plaintiff's bid on Schedule 
I, that is, for the walls and installation of rolling steel 
fire doors. That this was the type of construction and 
installation upon which the defendants had bid is appar-
ent from (1) the specifications, Exhibit A, (2) the terms 
of plaintiff's bid (R. p. 16) and stipulation (R. p. 40-41) 
and (3) the letter from the Army E'ngineers dated June 
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29, 1950 and set out in paragraph 16 of the stipulation 
(R. p. 19). 
(c) While we recall no admission in the record of 
when Mr. Child first learned that the contract had been 
awarded to the plaintiff, it is reasonable to assume that 
he knew of it very shortly thereafter. He was sufficiently 
interested in the job to call up Mr. Riding just after the 
opening "to see if he had the job" because "I had heard 
-it was general conversation you know-that I was the 
low bidder" and had Mr. Riding's promise to give him the 
contract as soon as they (plaintiff) "got fixed up with the 
job." 
(d) On July 3rd Mr. Riding called him about set-
ting the reinforcing steel. There was no occasion for 
Mr. Riding's doing this unless the defendants were to 
do the work and Mr. Child certainly so understood it. 
He answered tha.t he would "put it in as he went along 
with his brickwork, provided it was all bent, cut and de-
signed properly" (Deposition Riding p·. 20). Mr. Child 
already had Riding's assurance that they would' get the 
job when the Government contract was awarded to plain-
tiff, and there could be no misunderstanding about the 
terms since Mr. Child's letter of June 23rd was definite 
as to the work to be done and as to price, and it was the 
only offer the defendants had made to the plaintiff. 
We submit that these conversations and communica-
tions evidenced a complete meeting of the minds of the 
respective parties without any possibility of misunder-
standing by either. Both of them understood that the 
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defendants w·ere to do the brick,vork in accordance 'vith 
their offer. 
That ~fr. Child so understood it is evidenced by the 
fact that he notified the Brick Company that he expected 
to sign up "ith. Dam11 for the job and had ordered the 
necessary brick, 1,200,000 brick. 
There is not the slightest evidence in the record that 
the defendants had ehanged their minds or that the offer 
had been withdrawn until July 15th, when they repudi-
ated the contract and refused to proceed with the work. 
This "\vas over two weeks after the condition upon which 
plaintiff had accepted the offer had been fulfilled and the 
plaintiff had become bound to the Government under a 
contract for a price which it had submitted in reliance 
upon the defendants' offer. 
The situation here is practically identical with that 
upon which the Connecticut Supreme Court passed in 
the case of Raff Co. v. Murphy, 147 Atl. 709. In that case 
the plaintiff Raff Co. intended to bid on a contract which 
called for plumbing and heating, but since plumbing was 
out of its line, asked Murphy if he· was interested in 
submitting a figure for the plumbing. Murphy agreed 
to do so on condition that Raff would not obtain figures 
from any one else to do the work and would give him 
the job if Raff secured the contract. These conditions 
were accepted by Raff. Murphy then submitted by tele-
phone a bid of $14,300.00 and Raff asked him to confirm 
the bid by letter, which Murphy agreed to do but did not, 
and there was no written memorandum of the agreement 
of the defendant Murphy to do the plumbing work. Raff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
incorporated Murphy's bid in its bid to the owner and 
submitted it. Raff's bid was accepted and immediately 
he informed Murphy of that fact and told him that imme-
diately upon receipt of official notification he would notify 
him. Murphy expressed his pleasure and appreciation 
but two days later he called on Raff and said there had 
been an error in his bid and that he couldn't go through 
with the contract. Raff told him that he was sorry but 
that he had accepted Murphy's bid in good faith and 
was obliged to carry out his contract with the owner 
and expected Murphy to abide by his bid. 
Upon receipt of formal notification of acceptance of 
Raff's bid, he advised the defendant and mailed him an 
order to install the plumbing for $14,085.00, which wa.s 
the amount of Murphy's bid less the defendant's pro-
portionate share of the bond required from Raff by the 
owner. Murphy failed to perform and Raff secured 
another contractor to do the work at a cost of $4,200.00 
more than Murphy's bid. 
Upon this state of facts the lower court awarded 
Raff judgment for the excess of cost to do the work over 
Murphy's bid and the Supreme Court affirmed, saying: 
"The defendants contend that no contract 
ever came into existence between the parties. 
When the defendants submitted their bid to the 
plaintiff, to be incorporated by it in its joint bid 
for the heating and plumbing work, they made 
an offer to do that plumbing work for the sum 
named, conditioned upon the ultimate awarding 
of the contract to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff 
in the same telephone conversation requested a 
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confiru1ation of the bid by letter, and when, later, 
haYing incorporated the defendants' bid in its 
own, it heard that the bid had been accepted, 
and telephones the information to the defendants, 
and stated that upon receipt of formal notice of 
the R\Yard of the con tract to it it would notify 
them, there 'vas an acceptance of the defendants' 
offer and a sufficient communication of that ac-
ceptance to constitute a binding contract. In case 
of a bilateral contract, acceptance of an offer 
need not be express, but Inay be shown 'by any 
'vord or acts 'vhich indicate the offeree's assent 
to the proposed bargain.' Amer. Law Inst. Re-
statement, Contracts, p. 68. 
"'That both offer and acceptance would be-
come effectual only in the event that the plaintiff's 
bid was actually accepted and the contract award-
ed to it did not detract from the mutuality of 
their undertaking; the defendants had no right 
to withdraw from their agreement after the plain-
tiff had accepted their bid, though the contract 
had not yet been awarded to it. 2 Williston, 
Contracts, § 666. Nor did the fact that the plain-
tiff, in sending them the order to proceed with 
the work, made a deduction from the amount of 
their bid, representing a portion of the cost of the 
bond it had to file, affect the rights of the parties. 
The contract relationship had already been cre-
ated, and, if the plaintiff had no right to make 
this deduction, as upon this record we must as-
sume it did not, the effect would be merely that 
it attempted an alteration in the terms of the 
contract ineffective because not assented to by 
the defendants, and the defendants could have 
proceeded with the work and claimed the full 
price agreed upon. Barlow Brothers v. Lunny, 
102 Conn. 152, 128 A. 115; C. & C. Electric Motor 
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Co. v. D. Frisbie & Co., 66 Conn. 67, 94, 33 A. 
604." 
Since the contract relationship had already been 
created between the plaintiff and defendants here, the 
sending of the subcontract form, if it contained terms 
which the plaintiff had no right to add, and we contend 
it did not, would be merely an ine,ffectual attempt to 
make an alteration not agreed upon by the defendants, 
and the defendants could have held the plaintiff to the 
terms of the offer and acceptance. See Raff v. Murphy, 
supra. 
POINT II. 
THE TRANSMITTAL OF THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS A CONFIRMATION OF THE PREVIOUS ACCEPT-
ANCE ·OF THE OFFER AND THE SUBCONTRACT FORM 
WAS BUT THE WRITTEN MEMORIAL OF THE CONTRACT 
SO CREATED. 
Under Point III we will show that the subcontract 
form did not add to or vary the terms or conditions of 
defendants' offer. It clearly was not intended by the 
plaintiff to be a rejection of the offer. Nor could it be 
reasonably interpreted by the defendants as a rejection. 
Mr. Child did not construe it as a rejection of his offer 
for when Mr. Riding called him up on July 14th and 
asked him to go to Ogden to lay out the work, Mr. Child 
agreed and made an appointment to go the next day 
and said nothing about the subcontract form which he 
had received or that they were not going to go on with 
the work. Mr. Riding's request was certainly no evi-
dence that the plaintiff had rejected the offer, but is 
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consistent only \Yith a belief that the deal had been closed. 
Rather, the subcontrart forn1 was intended a.s mere 
1nen1orial of opera tiYe facts already existing within the 
n1eaning of the Restatenzent of the Law of Contracts, 
Chapter 3, Seetion 26 . 
.. ~lutual n1anifestations of assent that are 
themselYes sufficient to make a contract will not 
be prevented from so operating by the mere fact 
that the parties also manifest an intention to 
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; 
* * *" 
and the comment thereto: 
"'* * * It is possible thus to make a contract 
to execute subsequently a final writing which 
shall contain certain provisions. If parties have 
definitely agreed that they will do so, and that 
the final writing shall contain these provisions 
and no others, they have then fulfilled all the 
requisite for the formation of a contract." 
See Calumet Ref. Co. v. Star Lub. Co., 64 Utah 
3'58, 230 Pac. 1028. 
The subcontract form was a written confirmation 
of the prior acceptance of the defendants' offer, the 
terms of which had been previously expressed and neces-
sarily implied in defendants' letter of June 23rd and 
Mr. Riding's promise of the same date. 
POINT III. 
THE SUBCONTRACT FORM SUBMITTED TO DEFEND-
ANTS WAS NOT A COUNTER-OFFER OR REJECTION OF 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSAL. 
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The contract had already been made. If the terms 
contained in the sub-contract form or the letter of 
transmittal added to or changed the terms of the agree-
ment, it was ineffectual. As stated by the Connecticut 
Court in Raff Company v. Murphy, supra: 
"Nor did the fact that the plaintiff, in sending 
the order to proceed with the work, made a 
deduction from the amount of their bid, repre-
senting a portion of the cost of the bond it had to 
file, affect the rights of the parties. The contract 
relationship had already been created, and, if the 
plaintiff had no right to make this deduction, as 
upon this record we must assume it did not, the 
effect would be merely that it attempted an altera-
tion in the terms of the contract ineffective be-
cause not assented to by the defendants, and the 
defendants could have proceeded with the work 
and claimed the full price agreed upon. Barlow 
Bros. v. Lunny, 102 Conn. 152, 128 Atl. 115; C & 
c· Electric Co. v. Frisbie & Co., 6-6 Conn. 67, 94, 
33 A tl. 604." 
However, the subcontract form did not add to or 
change the terms of the existing contract or the offer of 
the defendants. The only points in the subcontract form 
to which the defendants voiced any objection at the time 
of their refusal to proceed were the words "Time is of 
the essence of this contract. General contract to be 
completed within 120 calendar days. $50.00 per day 
penalty thereafter. Subcontractor to complete his work 
as scheduled." 
These words certainly did not enlarge the obliga-
tions of the defendants over those included in their 
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'vritten offer. The \Yords ·~General contract to be corn-
pleted \Yithin 1:20 calendar days" are merely a statement 
of fact, of \Yhich the defendants had notice when they 
computed their bid (see SC-1 of the. Specifications). 
The srune is true of the penalty for delay (see SC-16 of 
the Specifications). They kne\v that these conditions 
\vould be imposed upon the plaintiff if it was successful 
in obtaining the contract, and of course when they offered 
to 
··furnish all labor and rnaterials necessary for 
the completion of the brickwork * * * according 
to plans and specifications" 
they knew that time would be of the essence of their 
subcontract Ehret Mag. Mfg. Co. v. Gothwaite, 149 
Fed. 2d 829. 
The phrase "$50.00 per day penalty thereafter" 
does. not purport to impose such penalty upon the sub-
contractor. The appropTiate place in the subcontract 
form to accomplish this, if that had been the intention 
of the plaintiff, would be in the second paragraph of the 
section Second of the subcontract form, and this wa.s 
left blank. 
Later, during the taking of the depositions, the 
questions asked by counsel for the defendants indicated 
that the words "S·ubcontractor to complete his work as 
scheduled" imposed an additional burden upon the de-
fendants or the making of some schedule for doing the 
work which had not been included in the offer and there-
fore left open something for further negotiation and 
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agreement. This contention, however, is absurd. When 
the defendants made their bid they knew that completion 
of the project required other work to be done by others, 
some of which had to be done before the brickwork on 
any of the walls could be commenced, and other work 
which could not be done until after the brickwork on a 
wall was completed. This was a schedule of work which 
the defendants proposed to follow when they offered 
to do it according to plans and specifications. 
The insertion of the words "including Addendum 1" 
was also intimated to be a variation from the bid. 
Addendum 1 is the addendum which provided the plans 
and specifications for the work in the event that the 
Government elected to use sliding doors instead of roll-
ing doors. We doubt that the substitution of sliding 
doors would have required any change in the brickwork, 
but it is immaterial here if it did because the defendants 
had bid on the plans and specifications for the ro~ling 
door construction and this was the type that the Govern-
ment chose. The only change in the specifications for 
the brick work made by Addendum No. 1 was the addi-
tion to 3-05 of the Technical Provisions of the sentence 
"J\1asonry shall not be started until concrete 'foundation 
has been in place at least 7 days." In reality this is no 
change, since Section 2.06 of the Technical Provisions 
in the original specifications required the contractor to 
keep concrete continuously wet for a period of seven 
days More·over, even if this were a change it is trivial 
since it could delay the commencement of defendants' 
work on the first wall only and the defendants knew 
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'vhen they bid that they couldn't start until the concrete 
foundations had set. Any delay occasioned by the re-
quirenlent that they be in place not less than seven days 
would be a delay occasioned by a delay upon the part 
of the contractor (plaintiff) or so1ne other subcontractor 
for "\Yhich the defendants "\Yould not be responsible. 
The other printed provisions of the subcontract form 
are provisions "\Yhich the plans and specifications im-
plied, or 'vhich would normally be implied in the· offer 
of the defendants to do the work in part performance 
·of the general contract. 
Taken in its entirety, the provisions of the sub-
contract form do not modify the contract already made 
nor incorporate other provisions not inherent in the 
offer and acceptance. Had the contract not come into 
existence previously, the subcontract form and letter 
of transmittal could be construed as an unqualified 
acceptance of defendants' offer. 
Calum-et Ref. Co. v. Star Lub. Co., 64 Utah 358, 
230 Pac. 1028. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT. 
The contract was made, and the defendants are 
estopped to deny it, where the plaintiff, in reliance 
upon defendants' offer, used the offer in figuring its 
bid to the Government and was awarded the contract 
and thus assumed a burden which it would not have 
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assumed but for defendants' offer, and injustice can 
only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise. 
The defendants knew that their bid for the brick-
work was low, that the plaintiff had used it and relied 
upon it in figuring its bid and knew that the plaintiff's 
bid was low and plaintiff would probably be awarded 
the con tract. Under these circumstances, especially when 
coupled with the promise by the plaintiff to give de-
fendants the contract for the brickwork when it got the 
contract, the defendants are estopped to deny the exist-
ence of the contract. 
This rule of law is formulated in the Restatement 
of the Law of Contracts in Chapter 3, Section 90 as 
follows: 
"A promise which the promisor should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
of a definite and substantial character on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 
The application of this rule to facts somewhat 
analagous to those in the present case is found in North-
western Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W. (2d) 879 
(N.D.) which was an action by the prime. contractor 
against the subcontractor for breach of contract. In 
that case the parties had executed a written subcontract, 
but the defendant contended that it was void for lack 
of consideration, and the trial court agreed. On appeal 
the case was reversed with an opinion reading in part 
as follows: 
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.. ,,~e are inclined to agree \Yith respondents' 
contention and find that the agreen1ent is without 
the customary elements of a valid consideration. 
Is this fatal to appellant's action~ The pleaded 
facts disclose that knowing of appellant's inten-
tion and desire to place a bid on the airport pro-
ject, the respondents proinised to enter into a 
binding contract to do the specified work at a 
fixed price, this pron1ise was not \vithdrawn, and 
relying upon the promise, the appellant submitted 
its bid to the government, as contemplated in the 
agreement. Obviously it "\Vould seem unjust and 
unfair, after appellant was declared the success-
ful bidder and imposed with all the obligations 
of such, to allow respondents to then retract their 
promise and permit the effect of such retraction 
to fall upon the appellant. Other courts have been 
confronted with somewhat similar situations to 
that which now confronts us. The result has been 
that there has arisen in the law a doctrine often 
referred to as 'promissory estoppel.' Williston on 
Contracts, Revised Edition, p. 494. While the 
appellant has not based its argument for a re-
versal upon this doctrine by name, nevertheless, 
we believe that the argument advanced by appel-
lant has as its basis the principle of this doctrine. 
The doctrine finds expression in Section 90 of 
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, as fol-
lows: 'A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance of a definite and substantial character on 
the part of the promisee and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.' 
* * * 
"* * * We are of the opinion, therefore, that 
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the defendants in executing the agreement made 
a, promise which they should have reasonably 
expected would induce the plaintiff to submit a bid 
based thereon to the Government, that such 
promise did induce this action, and that injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise." 
POINT V. 
IF THE ACTS OF THE PARTIES AS STIPULATED 
WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE 
INTENTION OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE OFFER 
OF THE DEFENDANTS AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
ACTS AND CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF TO CONVEY 
SUCH INTENTION TO THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOR 
THE JURY, AND THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS WAS ERROR. 
As stated above, there was no actual trial. A jury 
had been demanded by the defendants and they had 
refused to waive it or to permit the court to weigh the 
evidence as the trier of fact on the issue of a contract 
vel non. 
If the admitted facts are not such as to warrant 
the court to hold as a matter of law that a contract did 
exist, as we have contended under Points I and II hereof, 
they nevertheless presented facts, conceded and dis-
puted, from which a jury could properly find that the 
offer of the defendants had been accepted by the plain-
tiff. 
In this respect the case is similar to that considered 
by this court in Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Utah 313, 139 Pac. 
(2d) 1002, (supra). There at the close of plaintiff's case, 
the court took the case from the jury and granted de-
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fendanfs n1otion for a non suit on the grounds that there 
'Yas no evidence that a contract had been entered into. 
In holding that this 'Yas error and remanding the case 
for ne'Y trial, the court said: 
--The question of "'"hether defendants did 
accept or assent to plaintiff's offer is a question 
of fact. The e'idence being circumstantial, if 
there 'Yas any substantial evidence from which 
defendants assent or acceptance could have been 
inferred, then the case should have been submitted 
to the jury." 
Mter stating the substance of the evidence, the 
court said: 
'~(This evidence) indicates that the defen-
dants considered the matter to be closed and 
was sufficient evidence from which defendant's 
acceptance and assent to plaintiff's offer might 
reasonably be inferred. This should have been 
submitted to the jury." 
The instant case is stronger, since here the plaintiff 
has had no opportunity to elaborate the facts elicited 
upon depositions taken for discovery, or to counter 
such adverse inferences as presumably the court did 
draw from the testimony of the witnesses given by 
deposition. The court had only this testimony and the 
admissions and statements of counsel taken at pretrial 
and it will be noted that in several instances the two 
witnesses were in disagreement as to what was said in 
the different conversations between Mr. Riding and Mr. 
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Child, and in the dates when they occurred. For exam-
ple, if the conversation relative to the placing of the 
reinforcing steel took place after the contract with the 
Government had been signed, as Riding testified, and 
after Child knew of the award of the contract to the 
plaintiff, an inference of acceptance or manifestation 
of acceptance might be drawn; where if the conversation 
occur:red before then a different inference might be 
drawn. Similarly if, as testified to by Mr. Riding, 
Mr. Child had ordered the brick for the job, the jury 
might reasonably infer that he knew that the offer 
had been accepted. The credibility of the two witnesses 
on this and other points in which their testimony was in 
conflict was for the jury. 
POINT VI. 
THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS, AND WITHOUT 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND NOTICE 
THEREOF WAS ERROR. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the only situa-
tions in which judgments of dismissal may be entered 
without findings and conclusions by the court are 
(1) Where findings are waived (Rule 52(c)) 
(2) On motion under Rule 12, and 
(3) On motions for summary judgm~nt under Rule 
56. 
Findings are required in all other cases (Rule 52). 
In the instant case the record is barren of any waiver 
of findings by either party. 
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The order of disn1issal cannot be construed as a 
judg1nent rendered upon a 1notion for sun11nary judg-
Inent under Rule 56, or upon a n1otion for judgn1ent on 
the pleadings under Rule 1~ (c). No such 1notion was 
eYer 1na.de by either party. No notice of such a n1otion 
'vas ever made by either party as required by Rule 56( c) 
and notice 'vas not 'vaived, intentionally at least, by the 
plaintiff. 
~Ioreover, and most important, the matters shown 
in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file show 
very positively that there remains genuine issues as to 
material facts relating to question of the existence or 
non existence of a contract between the parties (see Rule 
56 (e)). The court made no order "specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy." (See Rule 
56( d)). 
We are certain that the plaintiff did not understand 
or consider the pretrial as a hearing upon a motion for 
summary judgment and are reasonably confident that 
neither the defendants nor the court so considered it. 
The motions made by the parties partakes more of 
the nature of a motion for dismissal after the· presenta-
tion of plaintiff's case (Rule 41 (b)), but in such case 
the Rule requires the court to make findings as provided 
in Rule 52 (a), and no findings were made. 
The use of the summary judgment as a means of 
expediting trials and the caution with which its use 
should be exercised has been frequently expressed in 
decisions in the Federal Court. One of the most recent 
is that of Judge Parker in the case of Pierce v. Ford 
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Motor Co., 190 F·ed. (2d) 910 beginning at page 915 
in which he says: 
"From what we have said, it is clear that 
there were issues in the cases for a jury to decide, 
and it was error to enter summary judgments for 
defendant for that reason. It is only where it is 
perfectly clear that there are no issues in the 
case that a summary judiment is proper. Even 
in cases where the judge is of opinion that he 
will have to direct a verdict for one party or the 
other on the issues that have been raised, he 
should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct 
the verdict rather than attempt to try the case 
in advance on a motion for summary judgrnent, 
which was never intended to enable parties to 
evade jury trials or have the judge weigh evi-
dence in advance of its being presented. We 
had occasion to deal with the undesirability of 
disposing of cases on motions for summary judg-
ment where there was real controversy between 
the parties in the recent case of Stevens v. How-
ard D. Johnson Co., 4 Cir., 181 F. 2d 390, 394, 
where we said: 'It must not be forgotten that, 
in actions at law, trial by jury of disputed ques-
tions of fact is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
and that even questions of law arising in a case 
involving questions of fact can be more· satis-
factorily decided when the facts are fully before 
the court than is possible upon pleadings and 
affidavits. The motion for summary judgment, 
authorized by rule 56 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S .. C.A., which in effect legalized 
the "speaking" demurrer, has an important place 
* * * in preventing undue delays in the trial of 
actions to which there is no real defense; but it 
should be granted only where it is perfectly clear 
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that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into 
the facts is not desirable to clarify the a pplica-
tion of the la,Y. See \\! estinghouse Electric Corp. 
Y. Bulldog Electric Products c·o., 4 Cir., 179 F. 
:2d 139, 146: -\Vexler v. Maryland State Fair, 4 
Cir., 164 F. ~d -1:77. And this is true even where 
there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts in 
the case but only as to the conclusions to be 
drR\Yn therefrom. Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. 
Dennis, 5 Cir., 166 F. 2d 61; Detsch & Co. v . 
.... -\..n1erican Products Co., 9 Cir., 152 F·. 2d 4 73; 
Furton v. City of ~fenasha, 7 Cir., 149 F'. 2d 945; 
Shea v. Second Nat. Bank, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 406, 
133 F. 2d 17, 22. As was said by Mr. Justice 
Jackson, speaking for the S·upreme Court in 
Sartor v. Arkansas Nat. Gas. Co., 321 U.S. 620, 
627, 64 S. Ct. 728, 88 L. Ed. 967: "Rule 56 auth-
orizes summary judgment only where the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
where it is quite clear what the truth is, that no 
genuine issue remains for trial, and that the 
purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from 
their right of trial by jury if they really have 
issues to try."'" 
See also the opinion of Judge Frank in Colby v. 
Klune, 178 Fed. (2d) 872 (2nd Cir.) and the· cases cited 
in the footnotes to that opinion. 
It should be noted also that the matters submitted 
to the court here had been submitted at a pretrial con-
ference called by the court and authorized by Rule 16. 
That Rule does not contemplate· a trial of the issues nor 
its conversion into a summary trial and disposition of 
case by the court as a trier of fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment be re-
versed and the case be remanded for trial in accordance 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
GEORGE A. CRITCHLOW 
A. W. WATSON 
NED WARNOCK 
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & WARNOCK 
1320 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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